The TDG is so Granulated
Why is 200 is better than 40,000 or 100,000 or 500,000?
I had a Medium chat with one of my lukewarm fans. PlainTalkBadManners (PTBM) has read a significant part of my TDG work. Alas, I have not been able to convince her to invest some of her spare time into the TDG.
She told me she worked for the Labour Party in the last UK election. I anticipate that she will eventually be disappointed with that party as it tries to govern. I hope that she will realize that her time would have been better utilized building the TDG. I must be patient.
But I digressed before this essay started. Here is the reason for this essay. In PTBM’s communication, she offered this insight into her understanding of the TDG:
Even though lobbying and campaigning isn’t part of the TDG system, sociopathic opportunists and bad actors would nonetheless use it to gain power. I imagine it would be yet another vehicle for those with political ideology to exploit.
There’s a lot to unpack here. Providing a quick answer to PTBM’s response probably won’t suffice. So I turned my response to a full essay — and put it where more people will find it.
Granulated?
First I should explain “granulated” a little better. In my part of the world (rural southeastern Alberta), I live in a provincial constituency of 40,000 people and in a federal constituency of 100,000.
I have written about the Dunbar number. Basically most of us can keep reliable social connections with only 150 people at a time. These are the people “we know.” People outside our Dunbar group, we don’t know that well.
So when my current ballot proffers five or so people — chances are these people are not in my Dunbar group. After all, 150 in 40,000 is only 0.4%. So I will likely not know much about these names, except for their party affiliation.
Since I became apolitical (not favoring any political party), I’ve gone through about 20 provincial and federal elections. In only three of these elections, I knew something about one person on the ballot. And that understanding came from people in my Dunbar group who knew one of the candidates, kind of in a Dunbar way. So my perspectives were not from seeing the candidates with my own eyes. For the rest of my elections, I really had no information to base my vote on good character and capacity for governance. I usually spoil my ballot.
Ballots in western democracy are set up to vote for party affiliation. Most voters have no other criteria to base their vote. Which justifies political parties. Which is good for the political parties. Which, heaven forbid, we just can’t have another way of voting!
The TDG Way
When the TDG came to me, it was like a eureka you hear of scientists having. The answer comes so quickly. Many insights into the current and a new way of governance tumbled into me in a few minutes. While everything was jumbled as the TDG poured into me, something said, “Dave, set up electoral districts of 200 voters.” And that number has stuck with me ever since.
A few years later, I learned about the Dunbar number. The number “150” is really not that far from “200.”
Two hundred is much more “granulated” than my 40,000 provincial and 100,000 federal numbers. As I mentioned earlier, I seldom know much about any of the names on those ballots.
Admittedly, I would not know much about most of my 200 TDG neighbors. But I would likely know about 20 of them. On voting day, I would figure out which of them best fits with my definition of good character and capacity for governance, and cast my vote toward that person. This would be more satisfying for me than voting for people I don’t know.
Any of my 200 neighbors who gets 30 votes or more has proven a good rapport with some of the neighbors. If four neighbors reach this threshold, maybe all four would be a capable neighborhood representative. The TDG election may not put my preference in place, but it will still select one from “among the best.” We should be happy with that result.
Nefarious characters
Let’s go back to PTBM’s original comment. She mentioned “sociopathic opportunists and bad actors.”
Nearly all of us would agree that western democracy allows too many of these people into governance. My treatise is that the large electoral districts allow these people to hide behind party banners. When the voters vote for party affiliation, these flaws are either unknown or cast as unimportant. So the sociopathic opportunists and bad actors move into the legislature, giving their negative effect to the legislative process.
One “rule” of the TDG is that there is no electioneering in TDG elections. But it won’t really be a rule. Rather it will become part of the TDG culture, built by conscious application of the early TDG builders. They will educate voters not to vote for a neighbor who appears to be campaigning for a TDG job. So campaigners will find fewer votes than the capable non-campaigners. There will be little point to campaigning.
Rather the neighborhood representatives will earn their votes by the rapport they have developed in their community — long before they were first elected.
Most neighborhood TDGs will find a capable representative. But a few sociopathic opportunists and bad actors will find their way into that first tier. When they get their position, they will be much more visible to their TDG neighborhood. They will show more of their flaws. It is doubtful that they will be elected in the next TDG election, which is only one year away. In other words, the TDG neighborhood is not stuck with a such a representative for too long. It will vote better next time.
Here’s another check-and-balance. The first-tier representative really does not have as much “status, influence, and power” as my provincial and federal representatives have. Rather the TDG representative will be a conduit between the higher tiers and the neighbors. The position will likely be volunteer, maybe consuming 20 hours a month. Ambitious people — like sociopathic opportunists and bad actors — will not like this TDG position. For them, it is much easier to climb the party ladder than to gain a higher position in the TDG.
The Second Tier
And here’s another check-and-balance. About four to 12 neighhborhoods will be gathered into a district. They will be meeting once a month to discuss affairs of the district and make decisions within their jurisdiction. Six months after the first-tier election, the neighborhood representatives will convene to elect, from amongst themselves, the district representative. This person will move into the next tier.
Because these neighborhood representatives have sat in the same meetings, they will get a sense for each other, kind of in a Dunbar way. Traits of sociopathic opportunism and bad acting will become better known to all the neighborhood representatives. They will be casting votes toward the more capable of themselves to move higher.
It is more unlikely a sociopathic opportunist or bad actor will be elected into the second tier.
Just try to imagine how someone like Donald Trump can move up the tiers.
Yeah, but Dave . . .
. . . most of us can not vote for that district representative.
So true. The TDG is structured around tiered, indirect elections. As a former political junkie, I understand how disconcerting not being able to vote for the top dogs must be. It seems the TDG means losing control of who governs us. Let me offer these insights:
1) My question would be “How is the current system working for us?” If you don’t like the sociopathic opportunists and bad actors in our legislatures, then we should look at a new way of electing our representatives, right? Remember, the political parties have proven not to be good filters.
2) Most people do not take their politics as seriously as the political junkies. Most people would be just as happy voting for a good neighbor, giving that neighbor their voting privilege in the higher tiers. The political junkies, a minority, should not be defining the rules to suit their quest for political drama.
3) When we see capable people moving higher in TDG governance — not sociopathic opportunists and bad actors — should not the political junkies just accept this new way as better?
Conclusion
Reducing electoral districts from 40,000 to 200 people will create a much different dynamic between the people and their governors. There won’t be many sociopathic opportunists and bad actors in TDG governance. When they do find a way in, they will likely be tossed out. They just won’t rise that high.
All because the voters know something about the people they are voting for.